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Judicial Selection
Judicial Selection in Michigan-
Time for a Change?
By John W. Reed
ow are we to choose those who
judge us? To whom do we en-
trust the responsibility of pro-
tecting our liberties and the
power to determine our rights
and liabilities? We look for men and women
of integrity, diligence, legal ability, and ju-
dicial temperament, chosen by methods
that balance judicial independence and
public accountability.'
Michigan has an elected judiciary, al-
though almost half of our sitting judges
reached the bench initially by gubernato-
rial appointment to fill interim vacancies.
This hybrid method of judicial selection
and retention has been in place, essentially
unchanged since the adoption of the Con-
stitution of 1850, having been last restated
in the Constitution of 1963. In the rapidly
changing third of a century since 1963,
many of our sister states have altered their
methods of judicial selection. Almost all
of the changes have been designed to in-
crease the likelihood of choosing judges
of high competence and to decrease the
role of special interests in selecting them.
The mere fact that other states have
changed is not by itself sufficient reason
to change Michigan's selection system. But
it does strongly suggest the desirability of
re-examining what we are doing and ex-
ploring possible improvements in the proc-
esses by which our judges are selected
and retained. The outcome of such an ex-
ploration can range all the way from en-
dorsement of the status quo to substantial
amendment of the judicial article of the
state constitution-or to something in be-
tween, such as changing the rules govern-
ing campaign financing.
But if changes are to be recommended,
they should be based on substantial pub-
lic consensus. Accordingly, the State Bar's
Standing Committee on Judicial Selection
believes that the Legislature should direct
Michigan has an elected
judiciary, although almost
half of our sitting judges
reached the bench
initially by gubernatorial
appointment to fill
interim vacancies.
the appointment of a bipartisan citizens'
commission to study "the manner in which
Michigan judges are selected" and to report
on "the need, if any, to change [it], in whole
or in part." [The full text of the standing com-
mittee's report to the Representative Assem-
bly accompanies this article-Ed.]
The report simply recommends that
Michigan's judicial selection methods be
studied; it does not suggest conclusions
that should be reached. But in making its
recommendation, the Standing Committee
on Judicial Selection was moved by com-
monly voiced criticisms of present practice,
summarized in its report.
QUALIFICATIONS
The only eligibility requirements for be-
ing a Michigan judge are that the person:
* Be a qualified voter of the jurisdic-
tion in which office is sought;
* Be actively licensed to practice law
in Michigan;
* Be less than 70 years old at the time of
election or appointment; and
e Hold no office in a political party.
Nothing in the way of experience or
demonstrated ability is required. A recent
law school graduate, having just passed
the bar examination, may be elected or
appointed.
This concern will be reduced if the elec-
torate supports the proposed constitutional
amendment on the November ballot to re-
quire judicial candidates to have been li-
censed for at least five years. But even then,
there will be no requirement of courtroom
experience, or familiarity with the law that
is under the jurisdiction of the type of court
for which the candidate is running.
INFORMATION
ABOUT CANDIDATES
Voters have little information about judi-
cial candidates, whether aspirants or incum-
bents, that would let them make informed
choices. Other than a candidate's own cam-
paign advertising or an opponent's attack,
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little information is available about the can-
didate's judicial temperament, learning in
the law, diligence, and other manifestations
of competence.
Some local bar associations and civic
groups conduct polls and rate candidates,
but candidates are not required to par-
ticipate and the evaluation systems are
not standard from place to place. More-
over, these groups have no authority to in-
quire into financial, criminal, or discipli-
nary records.
This hybrid method of
judicial selection and
retention has been in place,
essentially unchanged
since the adoption of the
Constitution of 1850...
It surely is not an exaggeration to say
that the voters who do cast votes for judi-
cial candidates-and they are only a frac-
tion of the turnout, which, sadly in our
democracy, is only a fraction of the regis-
tered voters, who are a not-wonderful frac-
tion of the citizens eligible to vote-the
actual voters know extraordinarily little
about the candidates' qualifications. Even
lawyers, who probably know more about
judges than most nonlawyers, typically have
only the sketchiest of information.
The consequence is that much judicial
selection is based not on information but
on mere name recognition (and, some-
times, misrecognition), which has almost
no bearing on judicial qualifications.
The situation is somewhat better in the
case of gubernatorial interim appointments,
in that the governor is presented with a
great deal of information about possible ap-
pointees. The State Bar Standing Commit-
tee on Judicial Qualifications makes a broad
inquiry and submits its report confiden-
tially to the governor. It appears that gov-
ernors generally pay attention to such re-
ports, but they are not required to and the
information in the reports does not reach
the public.
PARTISANSHIP
Between 1850 and 1938, Michigan judi-
cial candidates appeared on partisan bal-
lots. In 1938, the Legislature directed the
removal of party designations from judicial
ballots; it also permitted incumbent judges
to become candidates for re-election by fil-
ing affidavits of candidacy and nominat-
ing petitions.
lthough judicial elections, includ-
ing those for the Supreme Court, are
ostensibly nonpartisan, a Supreme
Court candidate must be nominated by a
political party before running on a non-
partisan ballot; and the candidate is for-
bidden, of course, to express to the voters
his or her views about substantive issues.
Although the established two parties are
the source of most Supreme Court nomi-
nations, some candidates have created new
political parties to gain a place on the bal-
lot. The pretense of it all puts to shame
many of the now-laughable fictions so
loved by the ancient common law pleaders.
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STANDING COMMITTEE ON JUDICIAL SELECTION
RECOMMENDATION
That the Representative Assembly adopt the following resolution:
"BE IT RESOLVED that the State Legislature be asked to direct, by joint resolution, the appoint-
ment of a bipartisan citizens' commission to study and report on the need, if any, to change, in
whole or in part, the manner in which Michigan judges are selected;
"That the commission consist of fifteen persons chosen by the Speaker of the House of Representa-
tives, the minority leader of the House of Representatives, the majority leader of the Senate, the mi-
nority leader of the Senate, the Governor and the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court in such a
manner as the joint resolution provides;
"That the State Legislature appropriate funds sufficient to enable the commission to discharge its
responsibilities; and
"That the commission be required to report its recommendations within twelve months of
its appointment." REPORT
Michigan judges initially reach the bench by election or, in case of a mid-term va-
cancy, by gubernatorial appointment subject to later election. The Standing Committee on
Judicial Selection has identified elements of Michigan's judicial selection processes that
on occasion disserve the justice system and the citizens of this state. The following are
among the most obvious and important:
" Judicial qualifications: There are no requirements of experience or ability.'
" Candidate information: Voters usually have little or no information about judicial
candidates.
* Incumbency designation: A device intended to encourage stability in judicial tenure
(usually a good thing), ballot designation as an incumbent protects good judges and in-
adequate judges alike.
* Voter participation: Of registered voters who actually vote in an election, a substan-
tial percentage do not vote for judicial candidates.
* Slating: In courts with several seats to be filled in an election, nonincumbent can-
didates cannot target a particular seat but must run on a ballot against all of the incum-
bents, and the seats go to those with the highest vote totals. As a consequence, judicial
elections usually fail to focus on qualifications or performance of individual incumbents
and place a premium on name recognition and fund-raising ability.
* Costs and fund-raising: Judicial election necessitates large campaign expenditures,
well beyond the personal resources of all but the wealthiest. Candidates must necessar-
ily seek and rely on endorsements and financial commitments from interest groups and
lawyers whose agendas and clients' interests may very well come before them if they
are elected.
* Down time: Most judicial elections involve six months of campaigning. Even though
judicial terms are staggered, courts are left short-handed while one third of the judges cam-
paign, a problem that is exacerbated on the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court,
where decisions require the participation of all judges on a panel or on the court.
* Diversity: Judicial elections do not ensure that the composition of courts reflects,
in some measure, the diversity of the population that they serve.
* Appointments to vacancies: There is no requirement that the governor consult with
a commission or similar body in filling vacancies and nothing, therefore, to prevent the
appointment of an unqualified individual.
* Accountability: Governors and legislators are elected to be representative, to be strong
champions of the preferences of their constituents. They must be accountable to the
majority public opinion. In sharp contrast, it is not the role of the judge to "represent"
the majority. Indeed, when questions of constitutional authority are raised, judges need
to be principled enough to defy current popular opinion in favor of the long run public
values expressed in the constitution.
* Partisanship: Party nomination of Supreme Court justices followed by ostensibly
nonpartisan election breeds cynicism about the process.
* Not since the Constitutional Convention of 1961 has there been a comprehensive
review of judicial selection in Michigan. Yet during these 35 years, two-thirds of our sis-
ter states, prompted by similar concerns, have moved to selection procedures that ap-
pear to provide greater emphasis on quality and accountability.2
For all these reasons the committee recommends the appointment of a bipartisan cit-
izens' commission to examine Michigan's system of judicial selection.
1. The November 1996 ballot will contain a proposed constitutional amendment requiring that
judges have at least five years experience as a lawyer.
2. Some methods are comprehensive, others are limited to one or more court levels. Some are
statewide, others limited to particular areas or subject to local option. Most provide for initial
appointment by the governor and/or Legislature from a list prepared by a broadly representative
commission, with the judge being required to run on his or her record in periodic retention
elections. A few are an amalgam of methods.
JUDICIAL SELECTION
FUND RAISING
Voter identification of a candidate is crit-
ical to winning any election. In the absence
of pre-existing high-profile recognition, a
candidate must mount a substantial cam-
paign, which today translates into the ex-
tensive use of all forms of the media. The
costs are great and typically exceed the
resources of most candidates. Campaign
funds must be acquired, and there is sel-
dom any choice for the candidate except
to become intricately involved, if only be-
hind the scenes, in the funding efforts.
Although there are some limitations and
safeguards found in election laws and eth-
ics rules, interest groups, including politi-
cal parties, are permitted to contribute sub-
stantial funds and in-kind services to the
judicial candidate's campaign committee.
Where the interests of a campaign contrib-
utor can be affected by the case outcome,
the ability of the judge to render an im-
partial decision is jeopardized. Such bias
could be addressed by recusal, but routine
judicial disqualification on the basis of cam-
paign contributions would be too frequent
when fund raising is such an integral ele-
ment of the judicial selection process.
DOWN TIME
Every two years, one-third of the state's
judges below the level of the Supreme Court
(where the terms are eight years) must face
the electorate if they wish to continue in
office. Until recently, re-election tended to
be the norm, and judicial candidates did lit-
tle more than announce their candidacies
and then spend a few low-key weeks look-
ing for support. Little thought was given
to the electoral arena as judges aggressively
protected their nonpartisanship.
Times have changed, and for a host of
reasons many judges face challenges in
their quests for retention. Even though ju-
dicial ethics require judicial duties to take
precedence over all other activities of a
judge and indeed forbid judges to under-
John W. Reed is chair of
the Standing Committee
on Judicial Selection. He
is the Thomas M. Cooley
professor of law emeritus
at the University of Michi-
gan and a former dean of
the law schools of Wayne
State University and the
University of Colorado.
MICHIGAN BAR JOURNAL SEPTE IMBER 1996
HeinOnline  -- 75 Mich. B.J. 902 1996
JUDICIAL SELECTION
take activity that interferes with the per-
formance of judicial duties, the reality is
that they are forced to devote considerable
time and energy every six years to their
re-election campaigns. Matters before a
single judge may be reassigned when the
distractions of campaigning make him or
her unavailable, but dockets lengthen and
extra burdens are placed on the judges who
are not up for re-election. The problem is es-
pecially acute at the appellate levels, where
decisions are made by a panel of judges
or the entire court: Decisions are held up
when all participants cannot be convened.
In short, Michigan's system of judicial
selection results in significant court dis-
ruption to accommodate the judges' need
to campaign for re-election.
A WORD ABOUT
ACCOUNTABILITY
In a democratic system, elected officials
in the executive and legislative branches
must be "accountable" to majority public
opinion. Elections in which issues of pub-
lic concern are debated and "representa-
tives" are elected are thus essential in a rep-
resentative democracy. The appropriate
role of judicial officers, however, is quite
different, making it appropriate to consider
whether some other method of selection
and retention of judges is desirable.
udges are not expected simply to reflect
the popular will in a "representative"
capacity. They are charged with the re-
sponsibility of deciding specific cases
brought to them by parties, even parties not
entitled to vote in elections, such as gov-
ernmental entities, business entities, mi-
nors, and citizens of other states or coun-
tries. Instead of carrying out a "mandate"
of the voters in a representative capacity,
judges are expected to engage in fair and
impartial fact-finding and then to apply the
law to those facts. For the most part, the
"law" is derived from the actions of the leg-
islative and executive branches of govern-
ment and from the constitutions of the
state and nation. Ideally, judges decide spe-
cific cases and controversies, "making" law
only interstitially, to the extent required to
decide the case at bar.
Election of judges in Michigan creates
a mere illusion of "accountability" to those
voting in judicial elections. In addition to
the difficulty most voters face in getting in-
formation about judicial candidates, the
Michigan has a good court system. It is blessed with many
excellent judges, chosen, some might say, despite rather
than because of the way in which they reached the bench.
information they do get does little to help
them make informed decisions, because
the issues are far different from those in-
volved in electing "representatives.' As a re-
sult, special interest stakeholders-mostly
frequent users of the court system and their
lawyers-have disproportionate influence
on the selection and retention process. That
influence is obtained by providing candi-
dates with the resources needed to buy ad-
vertising, which is essential to the name
recognition required for success in today's
popular judicial elections.
Michigan has a good court system. It is
blessed with many excellent judges, cho-
sen, some might say, despite rather than
because of the way in which they reached
the bench. But, in the standing committee's
view, there undeniably are significant prob-
lems in the present methods of selection
and retention that warrant a well-funded
study and evaluation by a citizens' commis-
sion appointed by the leaders of the three
branches of Michigan's government. If the
commission's conclusion is that nothing
needs to be changed, we shall have reached
that position by intent and not by default.
If it concludes that improvements are pos-
sible, we can, and must, set about achiev-
ing them. U
Footnote
1. See generally T. G. Kienbaum, Why Do We
Elect Judges?, October MBJ 1000 (1995);
H. 0. Lawson, Methods of Judicial Selection,
January MBJ 20 (1996); M. L. Proctor (ed.),
Michigan Judicial Selection History, October
MBJ 1010 (1995).
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